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Abstract Philosophical accounts of scientific explanation are broadly divided
into ontic and epistemic views. This paper explores the idea that the lexical
ambiguity of the verb to explain and its nominalisation supports an ontic con-
ception of explanation (Salmon 1989; Craver 2007). I analyse one argument
which challenges this strategy by criticising the claim that explanatory talk is
lexically ambiguous (Wright, European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2(3),
375–394, 2012). I propose that the linguistic mechanism of transfer of meaning
(Nunberg, Journal of Semantics 12(2), 109–132, 1995) provides a better account of
the lexical alternations that figure in the systematic polysemy of explanatory talk, and
evaluate the implications of this proposal for the debate between ontic and epistemic
conceptions of scientific explanation.
Keywords Explanation · Ontic · Epistemic · Ambiguity · Polysemy · Predicate
transfer
1 Introduction
Explanation, it has been often claimed, is one of the distinctive virtues of theoreti-
cal science, which aspires to go beyond the mere description of observed regularities
and generate insights which afford us a better intellectual grasp of the phenomena of
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interest, i.e., an understanding of why things are as they are. The idea that explaining
something implies seeking to understand it and make it intelligible seems to support
the view that explanation is primarily an epistemic affair and that scientific expla-
nations are among our most important epistemic achievements. In line with this line
of thought, the primary task of a theory of (scientific) explanation is to answer the
epistemological question of what sort of knowledge we gain through explanation. Or,
otherwise put, what exactly is our epistemic gain of having an explanation? A related
but different way of approaching the problem of scientific explanation is to ask in
virtue of what objective fact or property does an explanatory relation hold in the first
place.
Those who are inclined to take the former approach typically defend an epistemic
view of scientific explanation. According to these philosophers, scientific explana-
tion is an activity internal to a certain system or body of scientific knowledge. That
is, factors internal to a particular system of knowledge and the relationships between
them determine when something counts as a kosher explanation which can then be
evaluated in terms of its cognitive success, empirical adequacy, etc. On this picture,
the world contributes to our explanatory activities only insofar as it guarantees the
truth of the explanatory statements.1 On the other side of the debate, proponents of
an ontic or metaphysical view of scientific explanation hold that the explanatory link
between the explanandum and the explanans is grounded in some objective relation
which holds between the phenomena/events described (or otherwise represented) by
the two component statements of an explanation. Subsequently, on this view, the task
of a theory of explanation is to attempt to clarify the nature of this objective relation.
The debate between ontic and epistemic views of scientific explanation consti-
tutes the background for many arguments currently discussed in the philosophy of
explanation. Even if the field has seen a more recent turn towards a case-study based
style of argumentation which seeks to identify the norms that govern the construc-
tion and evaluation of particular modes of explanation used in different sciences, the
ontic vs epistemic divide continues to inform the proposed philosophical models of
scientific explanation (e.g., Craver 2007; Illari 2013; Sheredos 2015; van Eck 2015;
Wright 2015). This is partly due to the fact that this debate has typically been said
to determine the form that a philosophical analysis of the nature of scientific expla-
nation should take in the first place. On the ontic view of scientific explanation, the
theorising efforts should focus on clarifying the objective relationship which grounds
explanatory claims, whereas on the epistemic view, one should prioritise the task of
showing how explanatory knowledge differs from other types of knowledge.
This paper analyses one argument strategy which has been used by defenders
of the ontic view of scientific explanation to support the priority of the metaphysi-
cal approach over the epistemological one. The central step in this argument is the
assumption that the verb to explain and its nominalisation explanation are lexically
1This description of the epistemic view of scientific explanation is close to Kim’s (1994) analysis of
‘explanatory internalism’, according to which ‘apart from the determination of the truth of the explanatory
premisses, the evaluation of an explanation is a purely internal affair, in that the objects involved are
statements and they are examined in respect of their form and mutual logical relationships’ (p. 55).
Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2017) 7:41–56 43
ambiguous. This is then taken to licence the inference that the ontic conception
of explanation (OC) is logically prior to the epistemic conception (EC). In order
to evaluate this argument, I will focus on the causal/mechanistic view of scientific
explanation. There are two main reasons for choosing this account over other can-
didates. Firstly, causation has been one of the strongest traditional candidates for
grounding the relation of explanatory relevance. In consequence, most proponents
of the ontic view of explanation defend one or other version of the causal view
of explanation. Secondly, the fact that the causal/mechanistic framework allows the
formulation of both epistemic and ontic conceptions of explanation facilitates the
comparison between the two stances and their relative advantages and limitations.2
The structure of the paper divides into three distinct parts. I begin in Section 2 by
discussing a semantically based argument put forward in support of the ontic view
of causal/mechanistic explanation (cf. Salmon 1989). According to this line of rea-
soning, relying on the lexical ambiguity of the term explanation, one can show that
among the multiple senses of explanation there is at least one which corresponds to
the ontic conception of explanation and, in addition, that this ‘ontic’ sense of expla-
nation is conceptually basic. Section 3 analyses the linguistic arguments advanced by
Cory D.Wright (2012) against the hypothesis that explanation is lexically ambiguous
in the first place. In response, Section 4 aims to show that the linguistic phenom-
ena that defenders of OC have in mind are better diagnosed as cases of systematic
polysemy which is a sub-species of lexical ambiguity. More specifically, I contend
that the linguistic process of transfer of meaning (Nunberg 1995) is better suited to
account for the lexical alternations observed in the uses of the verb to explain and its
nominalisation. In the final section, I assess the consequences of this proposal for the
debate between epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation.
2 A semantic argument for ontic explanations
The ontic conception of explanation has been promoted primarily by theorists who
maintain that scientific explanation is broadly causal explanation (e.g., Lewis 1986;
Salmon 1984, 1989; Glennan 1996, 2002; Craver 2007, Machamer et al. 2000
etc.). For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the mechanistic version of the
causal view of scientific explanation. According to this view, to explain a given
event/phenomenon or regularity is to show how it fits in the causal structure of the
world, or differently put, to exhibit the causal mechanisms that are responsible for
its occurrence. The generic notion of a mechanism, on which virtually all defend-
ers of this view seem to have converged, is that of a complex hierarchical system
comprising a series of component parts whose operations are organised so that they
2In the causal/mechanistic tradition, William Bechtel and Cory Wright are some of the most prominent
defenders of the epistemic conception of mechanistic explanation (Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010;
Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2006; Wright and Bechtel 2007; Bechtel 2008; Wright 2012 etc.). Proponents of
the ontic conception of scientific explanation include Wesley Salmon (1984, 1989), Stuart Glennan (1996,
2002), and Carl Craver (2007, 2012).
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generate the phenomenon/regularity that is to be explained (cf. Wright 2012). Thus,
the ontic conception claims that scientific explanations reveal the mechanisms which
are responsible for the events and/or causal regularities of interest.
The ontic formulation of the mechanistic view of explanation comes in both radi-
cal and more moderate forms.3 According to the radical interpretation, explanations
are simply the actual (or real) mechanisms operating in the world and producing the
phenomena one takes as the target of explanation. This reading is not only explicitly
stated in Craver (2012), but it also seems to support the claim that the problem of
representation in science is orthogonal to the explanation problem. One can be com-
mitted to an account of the latter issue (identifying explanations with mechanisms,
for instance) without having any settled view of what counts as a good representa-
tion or why abstract or idealized representational models are sometimes deemed to
have explanatory force. The moderate reading is present in both Salmon’s (1989) and
Craver’s (2007) writings and it states that representational models of actual mech-
anisms can be seen as explanations. While the moderate interpretation allows for a
more substantial common ground between the ontic and the epistemic conceptions
(by recognizing the explanatory value of epistemic representations), it still forces
defenders of the epistemic conception in accepting a questionable priority claim with
respect to the ontic perspective.4
There are two primary motivations that seem to drive the ontic version of the
causal/mechanistic view of scientific explanation. First, the view promises to offer
an alternative to the covering-law model of scientific explanation (Hempel and
Oppenheim 1948) which construes explanations as arguments and cashes out the
explanatory relevance relation in logico-linguistic terms (Salmon 1984; Lewis 1986).
That is, the causal/mechanistic model arguably overcomes the challenges faced by
the Hempelian model of explanation by postulating that the relevant explanatory link
depends on the causal dependence relations holding between certain parts of the
(external) world rather than on the ways in which we describe or represent these rela-
tions. Second, it has been argued that the ontic conception secures the objectivity of
scientific explanations by grounding them in causal dependency relations encoun-
tered in the world itself rather than in the epistemic practices of particular scientific
communities (e.g., Glennan 2002, 2005; Craver 2012).
Taken as a general research strategy, the mechanistic framework seems to be neu-
tral between an epistemic and an ontic view of scientific explanation. However, in
light of the motivations sketched above, an increasing number of mechanists seem
to prefer the ontic version of the causal/mechanistic model of scientific explana-
tion. For instance, Glennan (2002, p. 348) writes that ‘while it is sometimes the
case that a description of the parts of the mechanism will entail a description of the
3These are not always explicitly distinguished by proponents of the ontic conception. For a recent analysis
that looks more in depth at the different versions of the ontic conception, see Wright (2015).
4Illari (2013), Sheredos (2015) and van Eck (2015) have convincingly argued that the ontic priority
claim is not strongly supported by either the conceptual or the empirical arguments offered in Salmon
(1989), Glennan (2005), Craver (2007, 2012) or other defenders of the ontic conception of mechanistic
explanation.
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mechanism’s outward behavior, the explanation lies not in the logical relation-
ship between these descriptions but in the causal relationships between the parts
of the mechanisms that produce the behavior described.’ More recently, Craver
has pointed out that the component entities and activities of a mechanism ‘are
organised such that they carry out some process, perform some function, or pro-
duce some end product [...]’, which he calls the ‘phenomenon to be explained
by the mechanism’ (see also Craver 2007, p. 27; Craver 2012). Along similar
lines, has argued that: ‘[a] mechanism is sought to explain how a phenomenon
is produced, how some task is carried out or how the mechanism as a whole
behaves’. Thus, most mechanists seem to endorse an ontic conception of expla-
nation when they agree ‘that there is at least a sense of explanation that is
ontic: that real worldly mechanisms explain their phenomena by producing them’
(Illari and Williamson 2011, p. 280).
In addition, some proponents of the causal/mechanistic view have developed a
semantically inspired strategy which aims to motivate further the adoption of an
ontic conception of scientific explanation. For instance, this argumentative strategy
can be found in both Salmon’s (1984, 1989) and Craver’s (2007, 2012) work on
the causal/mechanistic model of scientific explanation. The underlying assumption
of this strategy is that the term explanation has multiple senses and thus admits
of both an ontic and an epistemic reading. That is, granting the lexical ambiguity
of the term explanation, these authors claim that the process of disambiguating the
term yields/reveals one sense which corresponds to the conceptualisation of scien-
tific explanation corresponding to the ontic view. The semantic-based argument then
aims to show that the so-called ontic sense of explanation is conceptually basic. For
example, Craver writes that:
[Salmon] defended an ontic view, according to which explanations are objective
features of the world. This idea can be brought out by considering an ambiguity
in the term explanation. Sometimes explanations are text descriptions, models,
or representations of any sort that are used to convey information from one per-
son to another. [. . .] Other times, the term explanation refers to an objective
portion of the causal structure of the world, to the set of factors that bring about
or sustain a phenomenon (call them objective explanations). What explains the
accident? The ice on the road, the whiskey, the argument, the tears, and the sev-
ered brake cables. There are mechanisms (the objective explanations) and there
are their descriptions (explanatory texts). Objective explanations are not texts;
they are full-bodied things. They are facts, not representations. They are the
kinds of things that are discovered and described. There is no question of objec-
tive explanations being right or wrong, or good or bad. They just are. Objective
explanations, the causes and mechanisms in the world, are the correct starting
point in thinking about the criteria for evaluating explanatory texts in neuro-
science. [. . .] Good mechanistic explanatory texts (including prototypes) are
good in part because they correctly represent objective explanations. Complete
explanatory texts are complete because they represent all and only the relevant
portions of the causal structure of the world. Explanatory texts can be accurate
enough and complete enough, depending on the pragmatic context in which the
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explanation is requested and given. Objective explanations are not variable in
this way (Craver 2007, p. 27, my emphasis).
In the following section, I will focus on the starting assumption of the semantic-
based argument for the ontic conception of scientific explanation, namely that the
term explanation is lexically ambiguous. Whilst I agree with defenders of the ontic
conception that the use of the term explanation exhibits certain systematic lexical
alternations, I show that these are best conceived of as symptoms of the polysemous
character of the verb to explain and its nominalisation. In addition, I claim that the
linguistic process of ‘meaning transfer’ (Nunberg 1995) is well suited to account for
the observed lexical alternations in explanatory talk. I then evaluate the consequences
of this proposal for the debate between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific
explanation.
3 Assessing the ambiguity of explanation
In a recent paper, Cory D. Wright (2012) has defended the epistemic conception of
mechanistic explanation by challenging the idea that the term explanation is lexically
ambiguous in the first place. The following considerations draw on an interesting
semantic puzzle noted by Wright (2012, sec. 5) concerning certain patterns observed
in the use of the verb to explain and its nominalisation. Wright (2012) claims that
the solution to this puzzle consists in rejecting the lexical ambiguity hypothesis. In
contrast, I argue that a more satisfactory solution shows that the term explanation
does indeed display a particular form of lexical ambiguity, namely polysemy.
Generally, ambiguity is taken to be a feature of linguistic expressions which may
have multiple (legitimate) senses or interpretations. As a property which marks the
multiple interpretability of linguistic expressions, ambiguity differs but also relates to
other similar linguistic phenomena such as indexicality, vagueness, and context sen-
sitivity.5 Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between different sources and types
of ambiguities, such as lexical, syntactic or pragmatic ambiguity. Although advocates
of the ontic conception of explanation are not explicit about this issue, their argument
seems to rely on the lexical variety of sense ambiguity (cf. Wright 2012; see Salmon
1984, 1989; Craver 2007, 2010). Within the class of lexical ambiguous terms, one can
further distinguish between homonymous expressions and polysemous expressions.
A term is polysemous if it has multiple meanings which are related to each other
(e.g., book, wood, long, healthy, paper, since, etc.), and it is homonymous if its mul-
tiple meanings are unrelated (e.g., bank, bark, concrete, draw, fire, commit, etc.). As
will be shown in what follows, these two types of expressions tend to behave differ-
ently under some of standard tests developed in order to check for lexical ambiguity
5The arguments discussed in the following sections do not touch directly on the question of the context
sensitivity of explanatory talk. Although polysemy and context sensitivity are related linguistic phenom-
ena, the investigation of the latter type of alternation of explanatory talk falls beyond the scope of the
present paper.
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(cf. Zwicky and Sadock 1975). In fact, this observation seems to lie at the heart of
the semantic puzzled identified in Wright’s (2012) paper.
Wright (2012) remarks that the verb to explain and its nominalisation, explanation,
seem to qualify as having multiple meanings since they successfully pass some of
the standard tests for lexical ambiguity. However, this verdict is challenged by the
observation that these expressions fail to pass other tests which seems to indicate that
they are not lexically ambiguous after all. Hence, the emerging puzzle is whether the
term explanation has multiple meanings and if so, how close are they related to each
other.
Most of the standard tests that have been developed to check for the lexical ambi-
guity of certain pieces of language (discourse) depend on the presence of different
interpretations and on judgments regarding the acceptability of the competing inter-
pretations. The absurdity of meaning in this type of constructions is known as zeugma
or syllepsis. For instance, a common test for lexical ambiguity is the conjunction
reduction test which consists in taking two sentences that contain a purportedly
ambiguous term and conjoining them by using the term only once in contexts where
both meanings are encouraged. If the conjunctive sentence is sylleptic or zeugmatic,
then this is taken as a mark of the ambiguity of the target term. Consider the following
pairs of sentences (borrowed from Wright 2012, p. 384):
1. (a) Close your {door/eyes}, and then go to sleep.
(b) Close your door and your eyes, and then go to sleep.
2. (a) The {mistakes/patients} were committed.
(b) *The mistakes and the patients were committed.
3. (a) Firing patterns at the {neuronal/managerial} level can be irregular.
(b) *Firing patterns at the neuronal and managerial level can be irregular.
4. (a) *The neuroscientist and the chain of electrochemical events explained why
the neurone fired.
(b) *The explanation of why the neurone fired was given by the neuroscientist
and the chain of electrochemical events.
The targeted term in (1b) - the directive close - fails the sylleptic/conjunction reduc-
tion test and because of this is not deemed ambiguous. Things stand differently
however with example (2b), were it is immediately clear that were committed is pred-
icated of mistakes and patients in semantically incongruent senses. This makes the
sentence (2b) zeugmatic which in turn indicates the lexical ambiguity of the verb to
commit. Similarly, in (3b), the nominal subject firing patterns is ambiguously ren-
dered in terms of electrochemical activation and termination of employment, which
is demonstrated by the fact that the conjunctive sentence is sylleptic or zeugmatic. In
addition, Wright points out that the same result obtains for the verb to explain and
the noun explanation as input, in (4a) & (4b) above. As with examples (2) and (3),
the results of the conjunction reduction test seem to suggest that two different senses
of explained are being invoked and thus that the term is lexically ambiguous, just as
Salmon (1989) and Craver (2007) claim.
However, Wright (2012) correctly points out that there is competing evidence
which goes against attributing lexical ambiguity to the term explanation. More pre-
cisely, the results of other ambiguity-detecting tests seem to contravene to the outputs
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of the syllepsis/conjunction reduction test. One such test checks for a target term with
two or more unrelated antonyms. For instance, the expression light is ambiguous in
English between not heavy and not dark. No similar pair of antonyms seems to be
available in the case of the participle explained or cognate expressions.
Another ambiguity-detecting test is the test for contradiction, which checks
whether declarative sentences containing potentially ambiguous expressions can be
both truly affirmed and truly denied at the same time. If the apparent contradiction
of these sorts of constructions is eliminated by the disambiguation of the target term,
then the term is deemed to be ambiguous. Conversely, if the construction remains
contradictory, then the target term is not lexically ambiguous.
5. (a) That bank is not a bank.
(b) *The disease was diagnosed and was not diagnosed.
(c) * To explain is to not explain.6
In (5a) we can both affirm and deny the construction, since by disambiguating the
term bank, we get rid of the contradictory result. This is then taken to imply that bank
is lexically ambiguous. However, in the case of examples (5b) and (5c), there does
not seem to be any reasonable interpretation of the verbs to diagnose and to explain
which would eliminate the apparent contradictoriness of the declarative sentences. In
light of the result of this test we are again led to conclude that the term explanation
is not lexically ambiguous.
Finally, Wright points out that explanation-talk fails yet another kind of test which
involves the construction of syllogistic ambiguities. Consider the following syllogism
(cf. Wright 2012, p. 386):
6. The bike wheels are completely true.
7. What is completely true cannot be false.
8. ∴ The bike wheels cannot be false.
This syllogism involves an equivocation of its major term, because true in (6)
has the meaning of being corrected so as to spin along a vertical plane, but has the
meaning of maximally accurate in the minor premise (7). Wright (2012) contends
that the term explanation does not give rise to similarly ambiguous syllogisms, and
concludes that explanatory-talk is not lexically ambiguous after all.
At this point one might object that Wright’s argument strategy merely privileges
the results of certain ambiguity-detecting tests over others. This objection seems to
be supported by his claim that one should not take the results of any of these tests
to fix all facts about the meanings of explanation. Thus, he claims that whilst these
tests ‘enable understanding and insight about ambiguity, and while some test might
count as (defeasible) evidence in favor of positive or negative claims about ambiguity,
they are not definitive’ (Wright 2012, p. 387). Wright seeks to avoid the criticism
that his strategy cuts both ways by pointing out that our reliance on the results of
these standard tests ‘comes, in part, from statistical demonstrations of their predictive
and convergent validity.’ He goes on to say that ‘[i]t is precisely because tests for
6Examples borrowed from Wright 2012, p. 386.
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ambiguity do not provide absolute or definitive evidence that we appeal to a large
battery of them. Were syllepsis/conjunction reduction the only test used, we might be
subject to false positive results’ (ibid.).
In support of his claim that the sylleptic result of applying the conjunction test to
the verb to explain and its nominalisation is a false positive, Wright develops a com-
plementary hypothesis about why these terms seem to pass the test in the first place.
According to this hypothesis, the purported ontic sense of the term explanation is
metaphorical (figurative), and in that sense, derivative from its epistemic interpreta-
tion. That is, Wright (2012, p. 388) contends that the following pieces of discourse
are equally metaphorical:
9. (a) My car refuses to start.
(b) The mechanism of long term potentiation explains synaptic plasticity.
He claims that just as talk of cars being moody or having propositional attitudes can-
not be interpreted literally, neither talk of mechanisms explaining can, or ought to
be taken literally. Wright seeks to reinforce this claim by suggesting that the latter
type of discourse deploys certain elliptical techniques which facilitate the metaphori-
cal interpretation of certain types of explanatory discourse. More precisely, he claims
that the following pair of sentences exploit similar elliptical linguistic techniques:
10. (a) Average people think they aren’t (average).
(b) Mechanistic explanations involve (models and representations of)
mechanisms.7
If his supposition were correct, then it would seem to support the idea that the term
explanation has a unique interpretation since the semantic material deleted by the
elliptical mechanism (i.e., ‘models and representations of’) is a clear symptom of
precisely the epistemic conception of explanation. Nevertheless, I think there are
good reasons to reject this analogy. For instance, in (10a), the missing phonolog-
ical material is nevertheless present in the surface structure of the sentence (sic),
whereas (10b) does not likewise contain the purported deleted material. However, the
availability of the ellipsis process requires that the first condition be met (Johnson
2008). Thus, although given a certain context, the proposed epistemic interpretation
for (10b) might be perfectly legitimate, it does not seem to be fixed by any linguistic
material overtly contained in the original sentence. More generally, I contend that if
Wright’s claim that the ontic interpretation of explanatory talk is always figurative
and/or that it always exploits elliptical techniques is to carry any weight, then he must
say more about the linguistic operations that are at play in these cases. Otherwise, the
proposal risks to remain too superficial and ultimately unconvincing.
Thus, I conclude that Wright’s (2012) proposal to solve the puzzle of the lexical
ambiguity of explanatory talk by claiming that the ontic interpretation is metaphor-
ical or figurative and that it rests on the utilisation of elliptical techniques faces
serious challenges. Moreover, I claim that his argument against the lexical ambiguity
7Cf. Wright 2012, p. 388.
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of explanatory talk overlooks an important distinction between at least two differ-
ent types of lexically ambiguous expressions, namely homonyms and polysemous
expressions. In fact, his argument seems to rest almost entirely on the (more or less
explicit) comparison between certain semantic variations exhibited by homonymous
expressions and certain patterns observed in explanatory talk.8 In addition, Wright
(2012) dismisses too quickly the possibility that the term explanation is polysemous
(cf. Wright 2012, p. 385). In the following section, I would like to analyse precisely
this hypothesis and show that it affords a better account of the lexical alternations
observed in explanatory talk.
4 Transfers of meaning in explanatory talk
As noted above, one standard way to draw the distinction between homonymous and
polysemous expressions is to say that while both categories of expressions have mul-
tiple meanings or interpretations, only the meanings of the polysemous expressions
are related to each other, whereas the multiple meanings of homonyms are relatively
unrelated. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a precise characterisation of
what it is for the different meanings of an expression to be related, but in what fol-
lows I will emphasise certain candidate patterns of relations which do seem to hold
between the senses of a polysemous expression. Moreover, although I take this sort
of semantic relatedness to be a matter of degree, I will leave open the question of
how closely do the meanings of an expression have to be in order for it to count as
polysemous. However, this should not affect the validity of the solution proposed to
the puzzle of the lexical ambiguity of explanation.
I start by noting that I agree withWright’s (2012) observation about the disanalogy
between the results of applying the standard ambiguity-detecting tests to homony-
mous expressions and to explanatory talk, respectively. As shown in the previous
section, the former successfully pass most (if not all) of the tests, whereas the verb
to explain and its nominalisation seem to pass only the sylleptic/conjunction test,
thus giving rise to the lexical ambiguity puzzle. This contrast seems largely to moti-
vate Wright’s (2012) argument that the term explanation is not lexically ambiguous
at all. However, in making this claim, Wright disregards the possibility that the term
explanation, whilst not a homonym, might nevertheless be polysemous.
A first observation that seems to indicate that this hypothesis is on the right track
is that polysemies in general tend to yield unstable results to ambiguity-detecting
tests. For instance, the term healthy seems to pass the reduction conjunction test (cf.
(11a) below), just like explanation does, but not some of the other tests cited by
Wright (2012). For instance, the term does not have distinct antonyms which help
8Wright (2012, p. 385) points out that the term explanation does not seem to be homophonic (univocal
phonological structure and different orthographic and semantic structures), homographic (single ortho-
graphic form but different phonological and semantic poles), or homonymous (same orthographic and
phonetic structure but constituting fully separable and unrelated lexical items).
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disambiguate between its two meanings, nor does it pass the contradiction test (cf.
(11b)).
11. (a) The boy and the carrot are healthy.
(b) That patient was healthy and not healthy.
A similar point can be made by considering another common test for ambiguities
which relies on the behaviour of expressions under anaphora. Just as in the case of the
reduction conjunction test, certain anaphorical constructions that contain ambiguous
terms lead to zeugmatic readings which sound infelicitous or awkward. However,
even in the case of this test, there is an important disanalogy between homonyms and
polysemous words, since polysemy does not always lead to zeugmaticity. Consider
the following examples:
12. (a) I got up from the bank and then got some money from it.
(b) After John told me about this book, I bought it and started to read it
immediately.
(c) The mechanism of the flagellum that explains the locomotion of bacteria
was published in a peer-reviewed journal and it is now very influential.
(d) Tom likes to run so he goes for one every morning.
(e) Sarah hoped for change and found some in her pocket.
Whereas sentence (12a) which contains the homonym bank is clearly zeugmatic,
the polysemous word book does not seem to lead to zeugmaticity in (12b). Like-
wise for the term mechanism in (12c). However, sentences (12d) and (12e) show that
zeugmaticity is nevertheless noticeable with polysemous expressions whose mean-
ings belong to different syntactic categories or that are intuitively less closely related.
The important point here is not that the behaviour of expressions under conjunc-
tion or anaphora is an infallible test to decide in favour or against polysemy, but
rather that there are certain interesting similarities between the behaviour of the term
explanation and other polysemous expressions under these ambiguity-detecting tests.
Therefore, unlikeWright (2012) who takes the inconsistency of the results of these
tests as a symptom of non-ambiguity, I argue that explanatory talk exhibits a certain
type of lexical ambiguity, i.e., polysemy, and that the ontic and epistemic meanings
of the term explanation are more closely related than typically assumed. In support
of this point, I will describe in what follows a linguistic process which might be taken
to be responsible for the polysemic character of explanatory talk.
More precisely, I aim to extend a proposal put forward by Geoffrey Nunberg
(1995) who introduces the notion of transfer of meaning in order to characterise ‘the
ensemble of productive linguistic processes that enable us to use the same expression
to refer to what are intuitively distinct sorts of categories of things’ (Nunberg 1995,
p. 109). Although the notion of transfer of meaning can be taken to cover a large vari-
ety of rhetoric devices such as metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches, Nunberg
(1995) insists that unlike rhetorical figures that ‘are typically defined according to
the independent conceptual relations that they exploit’, transfers of meaning should
be conceived of as linguistic processes which cannot be fully characterised by rely-
ing solely on conceptual analysis. Moreover, this implies that figures like metaphor
or metonymy are best thought of as different sets of conditions that can support these
52 Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2017) 7:41–56
processes, rather than distinct types of transfers of meaning. Thus, if the proposal
sketched below is on the right track, it will provide a more direct answer to the lexical
ambiguity puzzle than Wright’s metaphor-based account of the alternations observed
in explanatory talk.
Nunberg’s (1995) paper focuses on the operation of predicate transfer which takes
the name of a property that applies to certain things in one domain into a new name
of a property which applies to things in another domain, provided that the two prop-
erties correspond in a particular way. More precisely, he argues that this process of
predicate transfer is subject to two general conditions, which require that: (i) the first
and the second property stand in a functional relation and (ii) the second property be
a salient (‘noteworthy’) feature of the object to which it applies. In addition, Nun-
berg (1995) points out that the operation of predicate transfer is available for property
names which are expressed by verb phrases, adjectives, but also by common nouns,
whether they appear in predicate position or referring position. Thus, the operation
of predicate transfer is responsible for the new meanings of the predicates and the
noun phrases occurring in the following examples (borrowed from Nunberg 1995, p.
110–115):
13. (a) I am parked out back. [where I = my car]
(b) I’m in the Whitney Museum. [I = my paintings]
(c) Who is the ham sandwich? [the ham sandwich = customer]
(d) The french fries is getting impatient. [as above]
In these examples, the operation of predicate transfer exploits certain functional rela-
tions (correspondences) between the locations of cars in a lot and the properties of
owners of these cars, between painters and some of their paintings exhibited in a cer-
tain museum, and persons in a restaurant and the dishes they have ordered. However,
as noted above, Nunberg (1995) insists that the process of predicate transfer is ‘only
possible when the property contributed by the new predicate is ‘noteworthy” (cf.
Nunberg 1995, p. 114), which intuitively means a property that matters. For instance,
he points out that utterances like (13a) ‘I am parked out back’ or ‘I am in the phone
book’, serve ‘to classify the members of one set of things (e.g., garage customers)
relative to immediate conversational purposes (of discharging the attendant’s respon-
sibilities, say) in virtue of their relation to the identifying properties of some other
groups of things (the cars).’ (ibid.). Otherwise put, this particular functional property
is deemed to be ‘noteworthy’ because it offers a useful way of classifying its bearer
relative to some particular conversational interests. The same point applies to exam-
ples (13c)–(13d). A different type of noteworthiness is exemplified by utterances
like (13b) or ‘American Express is in Singapore now’ (which means that Ameri-
can Express services are available in Singapore now) where the consequences of the
derived property go beyond the immediate conversational purposes. Despite their dif-
ferences, both types of relations show why noteworthiness is a necessary condition
for predicate transfer, and correctly predict the infelicity of an utterance like ‘I was
driven by Jean Gabin’ (even in a context in which it might be relevant to say ‘My car
was once driven by Jean Gabin’) or of ‘I’m in the second crate on the right’ uttered
by a painter who might otherwise legitimately say about one of her paintings, ‘I’m in
the Whitney Museuam’ (cf. Nunberg 1995, p. 113).
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I have focused mainly on the second (i.e., noteworthiness) condition of the avail-
ability of predicate transfer because it has some interesting implications for our main
topic, viz. the polysemy of explanatory talk. Note that, noteworthiness can be broadly
conceived of as a special case of relevance. This suggests that there are important
pragmatic conditions on the use of utterances such as (13a)–(13e). For instance,
many of the examples provided above are dependent on the availability of a spe-
cialised context. However, as suggested above, that there are some cases where ‘the
property correspondence that licences predicate transfer holds across a wider range
of situations, providing a more context-independent way of classifying the bearers
of the derived properties, which answers to more general interests’ (Nunberg 1995,
p. 117).
Thus, on the one hand we have cases of predicate transfer where the functional
relation between the two domains of things can only be exploited in a restricted range
of situations. Following Nunberg (1995, p. 116), I suggest that cases such as ‘the ham
sandwich’ are better thought of as ‘occurrent metonymies’, rather than polysemous
expressions (i.e., having one additional lexical sense along the lines of ‘ham sand-
wich orderer’). On the other hand, there are cases where the availability of meaning
transfer for adjectives, common nouns, or verb phrases can be taken to underlie the
patterns of lexical alternations associated with the phenomenon of polysemy. Nun-
berg (1995, p. 117) identifies several cases where the context-sensitivity of certain
expressions has been reduced by their repeated usage: painters for works (a Picasso,
a Derain, etc.), containers for volumes of stuff (She drank two glasses), writer for
oeuvre (fifty pages of Wordsworth), place for inhabitants (Indianapolis voted for the
referendum), etc. In these cases, it seems legitimate to say that the transferred pred-
icate constitutes a new meaning of the target expression which is thereby deemed to
be polysemous.
Although from one point of view there is no qualitative difference between these
lexical alternations and the cases of occurrent metonymy (e.g., they are both subject
to the noteworthiness conditions and to pragmatic constraints that determine their
acceptability), there are also some important differences. For instance, unlike occur-
rent metonymies, the lexical alternations associated with polysemy tend to have a
high text frequency, they become ‘idiomatic’ and even develop specialised senses
that cannot be predicted solely on the basis of general principles of meaning transfer.
My contention is that the verb to explain and its nominalisation exhibit the lat-
ter type of lexical alternations. That is, in the case of explanatory talk, the transfer
of meaning process exploits the relevant (i.e., noteworthy) correspondence between,
for example, descriptions or representations of mechanisms and the complex systems
they describe or represent. In other words, mechanisms acquire the new property
of being explanatorily relevant (in certain appropriately circumscribed contexts) in
virtue of the correspondence between the descriptions or representations of mecha-
nisms and the mechanisms themselves, which, as noted in Section 2, are complex
systems whose component parts are organised so that they produce the behaviour
exhibited by the system as a whole. Moreover, the frequency of usage of the trans-
ferred reading of the term explanation (emphasised by proponents of the ontic
conception of mechanistic explanation) further supports the fact that the lexical
alternations observed in explanatory talk are not merely occurrent metonymies.
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Thus, I claim that the availability of the operation of predicate transfer in the case
of explanatory talk supports the hypothesis that the term explanation is polysemous.
That is, there are good reasons to believe that the term explanation has two closely
related lexical meanings which correspond to the ontic and epistemic conceptions of
explanation.
The question that remains to be addressed now is which of these two senses can
be legitimately thought of as being primary and which one as being derived. In the
general case of predicate transfer, where we have a sentence of the form ‘x is P’, x
is a word that denotes something of the sort X, and P is a predicate that ordinarily
applies to a different class of things Y , and we have to decide whether it is x or P
that have a transferred meaning. Likewise, if we consider the sentence:
14. The mechanism of long term potentiation is the explanation of synaptic
plasticity.
two possibilities seem to be available: either mechanism has the derived meaning
of mechanistic description corresponding to the epistemic conception of mechanis-
tic explanation or explanation has the derived meaning corresponding to the ontic
conception of explanation. To test this disjunction, we could further consider the
following two sentences:
15. (a) The mechanism of long term potentiation that explains the phenomenon of
synaptic plasticity comprises the activation of certain ion channels in the
neuronal membrane.
(b) The mechanism of long term potentiation that explains synaptic plasticity
can be represented by the Hodgkin-Huxley equation.
Notice that whereas (15a) encourages the ontic reading of the term explanation, (15b)
promotes the epistemic reading instead. However, the fact that neither of the two
sentences seems to be zeugmatic suggests that: (i) bi-directional predicate transfer is
possible9 and (ii) both senses of explanation can be felicitously used in certain spe-
cific contexts. At this point it should be noted that the operation of predicate transfer
which has been taken to be responsible for the polysemic character of the term expla-
nation does not rule out that there are additional semantic and pragmatic principles
which play an essential role in producing appropriate/correct explanation-ascriptions.
That is, the operation of predicate transfer by itself cannot account for the various
types of context sensitivity observed in explanation-ascriptions. Moreover, the pro-
posed solution to the ambiguity of explanation puzzle is compatible with the idea that
there are other extra-linguistic factors which determine whether in a given context
an ontic or an epistemic reading of explanation is appropriate. Perhaps a case could
be made that the epistemic reading of explanation is conceptually primary in certain
contexts, but the present argument seems to support a relatively weaker conclusion.
Thus, I claim that the previous linguistic considerations cannot definitively settle the
debate between ontic and epistemic conceptions of explanation, but they do provide
some insight into the close connection between the two conceptions.
9For more examples of inter-definable categories which support the hypothesis of bi-directional property
transfer, see Nunberg (1995, p. 124–125).
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5 Concluding remarks
One of the primary interests in discussing the case for the lexical ambiguity of the
term explanation is to evaluate a more general issue, namely the import of our best
linguistic theories of explanatory talk for our epistemological and metaphysical the-
ories of (scientific) explanation. The arguments proposed in this paper suggest that
for the purposes of developing a substantive and insightful analysis of the notion of
explanation, these different sorts of accounts are best thought of as complementary.
Thus, the idea is not to use linguistic arguments in order to rule out a competing con-
ception of explanation. This strategy is problematic, since it would be completely
fortuitous if our explanatory talk came anywhere close to determining all the relevant
facts that a theory of explanation aims to account for. However, this underdetermi-
nation does not licence us to ignore the various semantic features and alternations
exhibited by our explanatory talk, especially when they might suggest new ways of
approaching the problem of explanation.
This paper has focused on a strategy used by some advocates of the ontic con-
ception of scientific explanation (e.g., Salmon 1984; Craver 2007) who draw on the
ambiguity of the term explanation in order to argue that the ontic sense of explana-
tion is conceptually prior to the epistemic sense. I have shown that Wright’s (2012)
semantic-based argument against the ontic conception of mechanistic explanation
identifies an interesting puzzle concerning the lexical ambiguity of explanatory talk
but also that it ultimately fails to provide a satisfactory solution to it. In response, I
have argued that explanatory talk exhibits a sort of lexical ambiguity, namely poly-
semy, which can be accounted for in terms of the linguistic operation of predicate
transfer (cf. Nunberg 1995). In addition, I have shown why these linguistic argu-
ments cannot, and should not be taken to decide between an ontic or an epistemic
conception of scientific explanation. Rather than polarising the two positions, I have
suggested that the process of bi-directional meaning transfer underlying the polysemy
of explanation supports the continuity between the two philosophical projects. This
conclusion, albeit modest, supports the idea that the linguistic study of explanatory
talk is not only instrumentally important, and that it constitutes a source of insight
and understanding of the nature of explanation.
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